This paper employs a recent methodological innovation on intellectual property rights (IPRs) harmonization to project global timelines for common policies against software piracy.
Introduction
The tide of decline in software piracy on personal computers (PC) in many countries a few years ago has been stemmed and reversed by fast growing PC makers in some of the world's highest piracy nations which have caused the overall numbers to worsen (BSA 2 , 2007) . Accordingly, dollar losses from piracy have risen by $8 billion to nearly $48 billion and with the trend expected to soar exponentially, there has been renewed interest in measures of fighting software piracy (Andrés, 2006; Andrés & Goel, 2011; Andrés & Goel, 2012; Andrés & Asongu, 2013a; Asongu, 2012a) . However, a recent trend has emerged on the feasibility of and timelines for common policies against the scourge (Andrés & Asongu, 2013b; Asongu, 2012b) .
In light of the above, this paper provides a global picture on feasible timelines for intellectual property rights (IPRs) harmonization against software piracy based on recent methodological innovations on the adoption of common policies. The empirical evidence is based on 99 countries and the richness of our dataset provides us with the degrees of freedom necessary to disaggregate countries into fundamental characteristics of piracy based on income-levels, legal origins and regional proximity. The intuition motivating the study is that, upholding blanket IPRs policies in the battle against software piracy may not be effective unless they are contingent on the fundamental characteristics and prevailing trajectories, dynamics and tendencies of software piracy within identified fundamental characteristics. The theoretical and empirical underpinnings from the convergence literature are twofold: convergence in piracy rates within a fundamental characteristic will mean the adoption of common policies is feasible and full convergence implies the enforcement of the common policies without distinction of nationality or locality within each fundamental characteristic (Asongu, 2012b) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly discuss the data and outline the methodology in Section 2. The empirical analysis is covered by Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Methodology 2.1 Data
We examine a sample of 99 countries with data from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI), the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) and the Business Software Alliance (BSA, 2011) for the period 1994-2010. The limitations to 99 countries and the 17 year annual periodicity are due to constraints in software piracy data availability. Consistent with the literature (Asongu, 2012ab, Andrés & Asongu, 2013ab) piracy levels source from the BSA (2011) and measured as the percentage of software (primarily business software) in a country that is illegally installed (without a license) annually. Since it is unlikely to find convergence within a very heterogeneous set of countries, fundamental characteristics are determined in terms of legal origins (Asongu, 2012ab; La Porta et al., 1998 , 1999 , income-levels (Husted, 2000; Marron & Steel, 2000; Kranenberg & Hogenbirk, 2003; Kim, 2004; Depken & Simmons, 2004; Moores & Esichaikul, 2011) and regional proximity (Narayan et al., 2011; BSA, 2011) 3 . The choice of the control variables is contingent on theoretical underpinnings of conditional convergence which state that, if countries differ in macroeconomic and institutional characteristics on which software piracy is endogenous then, it is possible for conditional convergence to take place. 9 control variables are employed in two different specifications to control for macroeconomic and institutional determinants of software piracy. These include: economic prosperity, research and development (R&D), internet penetration, population growth and IPRs laws (Constitution, Main intellectual property (IP) law, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties, Multilateral treaties and Bilateral treaties) 4 . The summary statistics show that, there is quite a degree of variation in the data utilized so that one should be comfortable and confident that reasonable estimated relationships would emerge. A prior correlation analysis which has served to mitigate issues of overparametization and multicolinearity shows that, there are no issues in terms of the relationships to be estimated 5 .
Methodology
The estimation procedure typically follows evidence from recent convergence literature (Asongu, 2012b) . The choice of the β-convergence strategy is due to constraints in the data set, which is panel. The dynamic panel system GMM employed is as follows:
where t i Y , is the proxy for the rate of piracy in country i at period t. σ = 1+ β. W , is taken as strictly exogenous (Fung, 2009, 3) . The dynamic system GMM approach is based on the last two equations. Absolute convergence is estimated without t i W , . In line with Islam (1995, p. 14) , yearly time spans are too short to be appropriate for studying convergence, as short-run disturbances may loom substantially in such brief time spans. Therefore, considering the data span of 17 years, we are consistent with Asongu (2012b) in using two-year non-overlapping intervals (NOI) 6 . This means in our analysis, τ is set to 2. We also compute the implied rate of convergence by calculating σ/2. Hence, the estimated coefficient of the lagged differenced endogenous variable is divided by 2 because we have used a two year interval to absorb the short-term disturbances. With 1 0    , we conclude on the evidence of convergence. The broader interpretation suggests, past variations have less proportionate impact on future differences, implying the variation on the left hand side of Eq. (2) is decreasing overtime (Asongu, 2012b) . (2) If so, what are the rate and timing of the convergence process? (3) For which relevant fundamental characteristics (of software piracy) do answers to the first and second questions apply? Whereas an answer to the first question will guide on the feasibility of harmonizing blanket policies, the answer to the second will guide on an optimal timeframe for such blanket policies. Ultimately, the answer to the third (given that the first-two are already answered), will determine the feasibility-of, timeframe-for and exclusiveness (or non arbitrariness) of the common IPRs policies. This third question is most relevant because, it underlines the need for common policies to be contingent on the prevailing speeds of and time for full (100%) convergence within each identified fundamental characteristic of software piracy.
Empirical results
Concerning the first question raised, software piracy is not converging from a global perspective. This implies the answer to the second question is not applicable. The absence of convergence at the world level justifies the harmonization of policies based on fundamental characteristics of income-levels, legal origins and regional proximities. The findings based on these fundamental characteristics broadly show that a feasible horizon for the harmonization of blanket policies ranges from 4 to 10 years. 
Conclusion
This paper has been a response to growing policy efforts toward IPRs harmonization against software piracy. We have provided the basis for blanket policies against the scourge using 15 fundamental characteristics. The global dynamic timelines provided are based income-levels (high-income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and low-income), legal-origins (English common-law, French civil-law, German civil-law and, Scandinavian civil-law) and regional proximity (South Asia, Europe & Central Asia, East Asia & the Pacific, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean and, Sub-Saharan Africa). In the timeline to full convergence, countries within a given fundamental characteristic can work toward feasible common policies and upon full (100%) convergence, the adopted policies can be implemented without distinction of nationality or locality. 
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